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Abstract
Globalisation is associated with long periods of sustained economic growth and credit expansion,
whereas major recessions tend to lead to falling trade and protectionism. The sensitivity of trade to
global economic conditions is not simply driven by policy: rather, in a model of costly search, rms who
are engaged in a searching process are very sensitive to changing economic circumstances. In turn, this
causes protectionism to be partly endogenous, since optimal noncooperative tari¤s can be high during
periods when the sensitive, searching rms have exited the market.
JEL classications: F15, F43.
Keywords: Globalisation, trade, search.
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1 Introduction
Why do periods of prolonged global growth, such as 1980-2007, tend to be accompanied by even faster
growth of World trade, particularly inter-rm, inter-industry trade? Why is the stalling of such growth
traditionally associated with protectionism? In addressing these questions, I wish particularly to stress the
two-way nature of the relationship between globalisation and Worldwide growth. Some characteristics of
the boom years of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, which were associated with the integration of India, China
and Eastern Europe into the World economy, are summarised in Table 1, below. Some of these features
(though not the vertical fragmentation of production) replicate those of the pre-1929 globalisation boom.
By contrast, the 1930s saw most of these trends go into sharp reversal (Crafts, 2004).
Table 1 Stylised characteristics of the recent globalisation phase
1. Relatively rapid growth of the global economy.
2. Fast credit expansion, international mobility of capital and ease of borrowing.
3. Trade growing much faster than global GDP,1with a high income elasticity.2
4. A growing extensive margin of trade.3
5. Rapid churn of trading rms.4
6. Trade growth based upon the expansion of traditional trading networks.5
7. Interrm, inter-industry trade growing faster still.6Vertical FDI/outsourcing.7Fragmentation.8
8. Growth especially concentrated in areas of the South or former Communist bloc
entering the outsourcing trade.
9. Reduction in protectionist barriers.
10. Countries which pursued open strategies outperformed less open economies.9
1See the gure on www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/pdf/0502, 06.pdf. In the period 1950 - 2005, only in 1958, 1953,
1982-3 and 2001 did trade decline relative to GDP: in each case, during a recession year.
2 Ishii and Yi (1997).
3Bernard et al (2009).
4Besedes and Prusa (2006).
5Rauch and Trindade (2003).
6 Ishii and Yi (1997). Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001).
7Markusen (1995).
8Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
9Wacziarg and K.H.Welch (2008). Dollar and Kraay (2002 and 2003). These studies are not without their critics - for
example, Luebker et al (2002). Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) give a more overall survey of the benets of trade
liberalisation.
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Some of the features in Table 1 deserve special comment. In particular, the (not uncontroversial) con-
clusion that more open, market-orientated economies experienced faster growth stands rather contrary to
standard economic thinking. After all, standard textbooks would argue that, while trade is good for all
economies taken together, in most circumstances it is in the individual interests of largecountries to im-
pose a protectionist set of optimaltari¤s on imports and exports, in order to improve their terms of trade10 ,
so that there is a prisoners dilemma situation, whereby the noncooperative outcome of tari¤-setting games
is against the collective interest. By contrast, one might tentatively view the evidence of the last 20 years
or so as suggesting that there is little evidence of a prisoners dilemma: open trade policies, which favour
a countrys neighbours, also seem in many circumstances to serve its self-interest. This is a feature which
I particularly wish to investigate: is there some characteristic of globalisation booms which leads to a con-
vergence of country and global welfare-maximising policies, and, if so, does such a convergence break down
during prolonged recessions or depressions?
In this paper, I link this, in particular, with point 3. - the high observed income elasticity of trade during
the economic good times. The starting point is that this high elasticity represents a footloose element of
supply, which is explicitly linked to the dynamics of a search process, and which may be the rst thing to be
eliminated during an economic downturn. Once that footloose element is eliminated, the economics of trade
protection are turned on their head - essentially, the prisoners dilemma is returned.
I start by discussing the phenomenon of rapid trade growth in the good times - building on the ideas
of existing papers by Ishii and Yi (1997), Rauch and Trindade (2003) and Rauch and Casella (2003) and
Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2005). In the rest of this paper, I start by outlining a partial equilibrium
model of a single industry with two-stage production, outlining the di¤erence between growing and declining
sectors and that between matched and searching rm pairs. I then set up a three-phase time schema, whereby
in phase 1 there is little trade, phase 2 sees globalisation and phase 3 sees an economic crisis. I develop an
explanation of why optimal tari¤s will be low during periods of economic growth, but high during periods
of economic slowdown, particularly when credit shortage is a contributory factor. Finally, the role of credit
in maintaining international trust and multinational trade agreements is examined in more depth.
10 e.g. Gros (1987).
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2 Fixed costs, search costs and trade elasticities
It has become a commonplace that costs of market entry impede global trading patterns, such that economic
integration, even in the good times of the 1990s and 2000s, falls far short of what neoclassical theory would
predict (Treer, 1995, Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000). Since this primarily reects limitations on the extensive
margins of trade (in other words, the fact that most rms do not trade most products internationally),
this is widely explained in terms of a xed cost of market entry (Tybout, 2002) - rms need to make a
particular level of prot in order to justify market entry, there are both selection e¤ects in favour of large
and successful rms (Bernard et al, 2007) and threshold e¤ects on entry. The latter, threshold e¤ect can also
be explained simply in terms of a Ricardian model of comparative advantage (Yi, 2003): once trade costs
fall su¢ ciently, the fragmentation of production becomes possible so that di¤erent stages can be carried out
in di¤erent countries. Consequently, there is a rapid, nonlinear growth of market participation, particularly
in terms of vertical tie-ups between rms (Yi, 2003). In addition, where tari¤s are ad valorem, e¤ective
protection against individual stages of production is magnied (since a tari¤may be paid more than once, as
the goods cross and re-cross borders), and the same applies to transport costs - so exaggerating the apparent
price-sensitivity of intermediates trade.
Many of these arguments are often summarise as the new, newtrade theory - i.e. supplementing the
models of Krugman, 1979 and Grossman and Helpman, 1992, with the incorporation of rm-level par-
ticipation e¤ects and production fragmentation. These elements are now acknowledged to have powerful
implications for growth through rm selection,11 distribution12 and the observed volatility of trade.13 By
themselves, however, they o¤er only a partial explanation, containing no real evidence of the nature of the
xed costs of market participation, and under what circumstances they may become sunken rather than just
xed. To explain this, we need to turn to another branch of the literature - the evidence of informational
barriers and a search process. This stems from stylised facts 5. and 6. in Table 1 : the high turnover of
trading rms (Besedes and Prusa, 2006) and the evidence of network e¤ects (Rauch and Trindade, 2003),
taken with strong evidence that clusters of low-cost producers can go unnoticed by traders for long periods
11Melitz, 2003.
12Feenstra and Hanson, 1999.
13 Ishii and Yi (1997).
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(the noted example being surgical steel production in Sialkot, Pakistan). Informational barriers can gen-
erate a search process, and I argue that this process is a primary cause of threshold e¤ects, which in turn
helps explain the dynamics of trade.14 Search takes time and requires condence and the availability of
credit. Critically, rms need to incur a series of ongoing xed costs during the search process, but once they
eventually achieve a satisfactory match, the cost of the past search is sunken. This means that searching
rms will indeed be very sensitive to price movements, as in Ishii and Yi (1997), but that, as the search
process goes on, rms achieve matches and become more heterogeneous and less subject to threshold e¤ects.
This process indicates a sensitivity of trade during the process of globalisation to international traded prices,
global aggregate demand and capital availability,15 but the trading patterns of long-established rms, which
are likely to be much less sensitive,16 and it is this nonlinearity - missed by the existing literature - which
may underlie the danger of policy shifts during and after economic crises.
3 An illustrative model of rm-level trade.
I set up a simple, stylised, partial equilibrium model of a monopolistically competitive industy in a two-
country world - the two countries being the North and the South, the former being characterised by higher
skill endowments per head. The main market for nal goods is in the North. Production requires two
stages, which I name upstream (u) and downstream (d). Typically these are carried out by a pairing of rms
(which may or may not be vertically integrated by merger), where u sells a semi-nished good to d, who
then completes the manufacture and sells it on to nal consumers. The two rms are of equal size and ex
ante expected e¢ ciency: however, productivity varies depending on the goodness of t of the match, i. As
in Rauch and Casella (2003) or Rauch and Trindade (2003), ; potentially follows a uniform, rectangular
distribution between 0 and 1, and rms do not know i before entering a match i, though they know its
overall distribution.17
14 Ishii and Yi (1997) use xed costs of vertical specialization to explain the high observed income elasticities of trade - which
they argue cannot plausibly reconciled with more orthodox models.
15 In terms of a macroeconomic model, market search has elements of capital formation, and so it should be no surprise that
it has many of the characteristics of investment demand - in terms of cyclical sensitivity.
16This reects in part the heterogeneity both of rms (Melitz, 2003) and of trading match quality (Rauch and Casella, 2003).
17This setup is derived from Salops circular cylinder, and is standard in rm-level matching models. Note that Grossman
and Helpmans (2002) model is similar, except that rms know with certainty the location of potential partners, and always
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Trade between the North and South develops over time. The historical setup takes three phases. In
phase 1, trade costs are high, so that there is little trade, and most goods are produced by pairings of rms
type u and d within the North. However, the South is assumed to have a potential comparative advantage
in upstream production, while the North has a comparative advantage in downstream production. We
then enter phase 2: a period of growth and global integration, spurred by a technological or policy change
reducing trade costs. Some Northern downstream rms (though not all) will now search for upstream
partners in the South. For example, garments might be manufactured by an upstream rm in China, but
according to designs from the downstream rm in a Western economy, which then completes the marketing
and distribution worldwide. Phase 3 represents an unanticipated crisis, where credit ceases to be available
and growth stalls for a protracted period.
Concentrating on phase 2, the period of globalisation, the growth of the outsourcing trade is impeded by
search friction deriving from an assumed need for at least one rm to make a relationship-specic investment:
in order to avoid a potential hold-up problem,18 this generally requires a contractual relationship for at least
some minimum period, which I characterise by a xed contract period, t, during which the two rms have
an exclusive relationship.
Firms employ labour in the form of xed and variable elements. The cost of the latter is normalised at
C = CN for North-North pairings, and at C = CS (CS < CN ) for North-South pairings. The elasticity of
substitution between nal goods varieties is ", which will also closely approximate the own-price elasticity
for the output sold by rm pairings, at least as long as the number of rms, N , is large. Sales by pairing i
will equal
Yi = A(
"Ci
("  1)P  )
 "; i 2 fN;Sg; (1)
where P  is the CES aggregate price index. Prots of the pairing, before subtracting xed costs, will equal
i =
A
"
(
"Ci
("  1))
1 "P " = kC1 "i P
": (2)
The model is driven by an assumed cost which is inversely linearly related to the quality of the match i
match with the nearest.
18See Hart (1995).
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between rms in pairing i. For simplicity, I concentrate on a rather stylised model where quality of match
a¤ects xed cost, rather than unit variable costs. More precisely, I assume that xed costs are F   i, so
that prots after subtracting xed cost,
i = kC
1 "
i P
"   F + i: (3)
Note I am also assuming equal Nash bargaining weights between the upstream and downstream rms.
3.1 The matching process
We now want to look at the matching process in more detail. Appendix 1 explains the matching process
in more detail. I assume rms take a series of blind matches, where match quality, i, varies according to
a uniform rectangular distribution between 0 and 1. Further, assume that rms are stuck with an existing
partner for a xed contract period, t, during which time rms face a discount rate r. Firm pairings are also
subject to sudden, random death with a constant probability of d. For simplicity, I normalise the discount
rate in terms of the contract period, dening the discount rate and depreciation rate per contract period,
 = (1 + r)t   1; (4a)
D =
1
(1  d)2t   1: (4b)
Note that the depreciation rate reects the probability of either rm in a pairing dying during the contract
period.
At the end of each contract period, the rm may either stick with its existing partner (which it will do
if match quality i exceeds a reservation match quality, 
R), or else seek a new partner (which it will do if
i < 
R). Note that, as we have assumed a uniform, rectangular ex ante probability distribution of match
quality, the probability that search will be renewed, after the initial match period will equal R: However,
over time, the probability of not having found a successful match will decline geometrically. By noting that,
when i = 
R, a pair of rms will be indi¤erent between renewing search or staying together, we can derive
the condition for equating discounted present value of searching and not searching, and so nd a value for
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the reservation match quality. This can be shown to satisfy
R = 1 + +D  
p
(+D)(1 + +D); (5)
which is declining as  or D increases.
From (8), we can conclude that, with zero discount rates and zero probability of rm death (r = d =
 = D = 0), rms will be innitely patient in their search, so that the long-run equilibrium is for all rms
to be equally and successfully matched. By contrast (and more realistically), with positive time preference,
the long-run equilibrium has a uniform distribution of surviving matches, of quality ranging from R to 1,
with prots likewise varying. A consequence is that rm pairings are heterogeneous in the long-run, both in
terms of prots and trade volumes, with heterogeneity increasing when long-run interest rates are higher or
contract periods are longer.
3.2 The role of monopolistic competition
I assume there is free entry and exit into the industry. Consequently, the number of rm pairings will vary,
with competition forcing the industry aggregate price, P  up or down so as to make the marginal rm
indi¤erent as to whether to enter or exit.
I focus rst on an expanding industry. In this case, the marginal rm is a new, searching rm. The
condition for determining the reservation match quality means that the expected present discounted prot
of entering and engaging in a new search will equal that of a rm in a stable match of quality R:
i = kC
1 "
i P
"   F + i;
i = 0 when i = R;
P  = (
F   R
k
)
1
"C
" 1
"
N ; (6)
where Cm is the unit cost of the marginal pairing (so it will equal CN during the pre-globalisation phase 1,
and CS during phase 2). In phase 1, all rms have the same unit cost Cm, and if we also note that the CES
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aggregate price
P  = N
1
1 "Cm; (7)
where N is the number of pairings in the industry, then the initial number of pairings
N1 = (
F   R
kCm
)
1 "
" : (8)
4 The stages of development of North-South interrm trade
I discuss the three phases of the stylised time-scheme in turn.
4.1 Phase 1: the pre-globalisation, Northern economy
I start by concentrating on the initial phase 1 of our time-scheme, when trade costs are su¢ cient to ensure
that there are no matches between Northern and Southern partners. I consider an equilibrium, where the
industry in the North is initially static, with demand and prices constant.
I start by characterising rm pairs on this initial equilibrium growth path as establishedor matched,
if they are already in a settled match (i > R) at the start of a contract period - otherwise, we dene them
as searching.
The basic situation is shown in Figure 1, below. Since unit variable cost with Northern pairings is 1, rm
pairs will supply at a price of
P 1 = (
F   R
k
)
1
" : (9)
Searching rms will only engage in search if the price is at least P 1 : free entry will keep the price to this
level, as long as the industry is not shrinking. Matched rm pairings will also supply at this price, though
most of these are intramarginal matches, which would continue to produce if the price were to fall (hence the
upward-sloping supply curve for matched rms). The number of rms in the industry will satisfy (8), and
also balance demand and supply at the price P 1 : I will denote this initial demand level for the industrys
products as Y 1 .
If rms were innitely-lived, the economy would tend towards a steady-state equilibrium where all rms
9
were matched (i > R). However, if proportion D of rm pairings su¤er in a given contract period from one
or both rms randomly expiring, then there will be some new rms entering and searching. In equilibrium,
I denote the number of matched rms in period 1 as Nm1 and the number of searching rms as Ns1. In the
next contract period, proportion D of existing matched pairings will expire, while proportion (1   R) of
searching pairings will nd established partners. In a static equilibrium, where Nm is constant over time,
this implies
Ns1
Nm1
=
D
1  R
: (10)
If the number of rms in the industry were growing at rate G, this would become
Ns1
Nm1
=
G+D
1  R
: (10a)
P'1
P*
Domestic
supply
Demand
Y
Industry
price P
Domestic sales by matched
firms
Figure 1: Equilibrium in the pre-globalisation Northern economy
Domestic sales by
searching
firms
This situation is shown in Figure 1, above. The price in equilibrium, P 1 , is given by the entry price for
new, searching pairings. However, there is a kink in the supply curve, since searching pairings will all enter
or leave the market at P1 = P 1 , while matched rms are heterogeneous in the price at which they would
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exit the market. The most e¢ cient rm pairing would potentially leave the market at P1 = P 1 , as given in
equation (9). The ratio of searching to matched rms in equilibrium is given by equation (10) or (10a).
4.2 Phase 2: The globalising economy
Now assume that trade costs fall, so that upstream production in the South becomes more competitive.
In particular, assume that unit variable costs, including trade costs, for a North-South pairing are CS , as
opposed to 1 for a North-North pairing. However to enter the market, foreign rms of type u have to engage
in a costly search process, and so will only do so at a World reference price of
P 2 = P

1C
" 1
"
S ; (11)
at which a rm in a reservation-quality pairing breaks even.
The e¤ect on existing North-North pairings is variable. The NS1 searching Northern pairings would not
expect to break even at the new, lower price, and consequently will exit the market, except for a fraction
who nd their existing partners protable and become matched.
The Nm1 existing matched North-North pairings are heterogeneous, since they vary in match quality
between R and 1. The price at which a matched pairing of quality i will exit the market is given by
P 0i = (
F   i
k
)
1
" = P 1 (
F   i
F   R
)
1
" : (12)
The last rm will exit when
P 01 = P

1 (
F   1
F   R
)
1
" : (12a)
I assume North-South pairings are not su¢ ciently low-price to drive the price down to this level. At price
P 2; the proportion of rms in existing North-North pairings which will continue in the market is
N2 =
1  i
1  R
= 1  (F   R)(1  C
" 1
"
S )
1  R
; (13)
which is declining as CS falls. Output of these pairings will also be lower than before the start of globalisation
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by proportion (P

2
P1
) ", since the industry aggregate price has fallen. However, total industry output will be
higher, due to the fall in prices: I denote the own-price demand elasticity for the industrys output as  ;
so that
Y 2
Y 1
= (
P 2
P 1
) : (14)
The residual will be made up by new, North-South pairings. Initially, these will be searching, but over
time, in a model with static overall demand, the proportion of these still searching will decline, as some gain
matches, until eventually the ratio of searching to matched pairs among the North-South pairings will equal
that in equation (10).
P'1
P*1
Domestic
supply
Demand
Y
Industry
Price P
Domestic sales
Figure 2: Demand and supply in the globalising
Northern economy
Sales by foreign
matched firms
Sales by foreign
searching firms
P*2
P'2
Figure 2, above, shows the situation in an economy during the globalisation phase. Searching North-South
(foreign) pairings are prepared to enter the market at price P 2 , which is lower than P

1 ; but assumed to be
above P 01. Consequently, all North-North (domestic) searching pairings exit the market, as do some matched
North-North pairings. Once some North-South pairings nd successful matches, the result is a supply curve
with three segments (i.e. two kinks). First, between P 02 and P
0
1 (the left segment), only the most successful
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North-South pairings will be prepared to supply. Between P 01 and P

2 we are summing horizontally the
supply curves of North-North and North-South matched pairings, so the gradient is somewhat less steep.
Finally, when the industry aggregate price, P  = P 2 , there is a horizontal segment made up of searching
North-South pairings.
The kinks in this supply curve are an important element in explaining the di¤erential e¤ects of economic
shocks, and the potential change in policy following such shocks - as explained in the subsequent sections.
Figure 3, below, summarises some simulations on the evolution of the proportions of di¤erent types of
rm pairings over time, following a 10% reduction in the cost of North-South pairings. These are based upon
the following parameter assumptions:
Time preference per contract period  0.08
Death rate of one rm in pairing D 0.02
Basic xed cost of market participation F 1
Subs elasticity between rms " 5
Own price elasticity for industry output  -1
Implied reservation match quality R 0.768.
Simulations are carried out for underlying demand growth rates of 2%, 5% and 8%. After 20 periods,
the proportions of searching NS pairings vary between 15 30 per cent, depending on demand growth, while
matched NS pairings are 56  62 per cent and NN pairings 8  29 per cent of the market.
Figure 3: Evolution of different types of pairings,
after a reduction in trade costs starts a
globalisation phase, related to the underlying
growth of demand per annum
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5 The impact of a negative economic shock
5.1 A demand shock
We now want to conside the e¤ect of shocks to an economy which has been undergoing the process of
globalisation (in the sense of entry by searching foreign upstream rms, and the gradual development of
successful, importing partnerships). Take the situation in Figure 2, and assume that there is a sudden
inward shift in the demand curve, caused by a recession. The situation is shown in Figure 4 : essentially,
searching foreign rms are footloose, and will simply exit the market at the end of their existing contracts
(except for the minority who nd protable contracts). This is a component of import supply which is very
sensitive to demand changes. Consequently, unless the demand shock is very large, it can be accommodated
simply by the exit of these rms: the remaining foreign and domestic rms see very little change in their
demand or prices. Only larger shocks will force established rm pairings back down their supply curves.
P'1
P*1
Domestic
supply
Demand
Y
P
Domestic sales
Figure 4: A negative demand shock which wipes out
searching firms, leaving matched firms unchanged
Sales by foreign
matched firms
Sales by foreign
searching firms
wiped out by
demand fall
P*2
P'2
Note that, at the point where searching North-South pairings have been eliminated, the elasticity of
imports with respect to the industry aggregate price falls from innite to "R ; and continues to rise thereafter,
as more rms are driven out.
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The situation with a larger negative demand shock is that, only after seaching rms have been eliminated
will prices be driven down. At this point, existing domestic pairings, as well as established importing pairings
will be faced with falling prices, and the least e¢ cient will be eliminated (so driving the rms down their
supply curves). This is shown in Figure 5, below.
P'1
P*1
Demand
Y
P
Figure 5: A larger negative demand shock
P*2
P'2
P*3
Sales by North-
North pairings
Sales by Matched North-
South pairings
Before
After
Sales by Searching North-
South pairings
Note that an implication is that the rst rm pairings to exit the market are searching, North-South
pairings, so that trade is especially vulnerable to a medium shock. In the larger shock in Figure 4, matched
North-North pairings will exit faster than matched North-South pairings in the ratio
N3
S3
=
P 2   P 01
P 2   P 02
< 1: (15)
5.2 A credit shock
A credit shock is somewhat harder to model - particularly where it results in shortages of cash, rather than
a rise in headline interest rates. Nevertheless, I will assume that rms suddenly face a rise in risk premia on
15
their interest rates, so that the interest rate per contract period rises to
0 > :
I consider the unlikely phenomenon of a pure credit shock (one which a¤ects supply, but does not result
in a recession shifting the demand curve inwads). It is worth noting that this type of shock hits di¤erent
rms disproportionately. In particular, by raising the de facto interest rate facing rms, a credit shortage
will make the search process costly. As a result, the reservation match quality will fall (rms will accept
lower-quality reservation matches than previously, when they were more patient). The implication of this is
that the reservation match quality falls to
0R = 1 + 
0 +D  
p
(0 +D)(1 + 0 +D) < R: (16)
However, since the reservation price which overseas rms type u will demand in order to enter into search
is
P  =
R
0R
P 2 (17)
; this will now be higher than previously. However, while the supply price of searching rms is raised, the
supply curves of established rms are unchanged. Figure 6,. below, shows a pure credit shock, just su¢ cient
to drive searching foreign rms out of the market, while raising prices at home (hence leading to established
domestic and foreign rms supplying marginally more than before). Note that the price does not rise as far
as P , so that search is halted entirely in the short/medium run.19 Existing rms can supply somewhat
more than previously, as the market price, P ; rises, in accordance with equation (1). However, new rms
cannot enter unless the price rises to P , so below that level supply is relatively inelastic.
19 In the longer run, depreciation of the stock of existing matched rms at rate D will gradually raise the supply cost and
price, until it reaches P  and new rms start to enter and search again.
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Figure 6: Effect of a credit shock increasing the cost
for searching firms
Sales by foreign
matched firms
P*2
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import  supply
Cost of searching firms
P**
In reality, we should perhaps consider that, at least in their initial stages, credit shocks are usually asso-
ciated with demand shocks as well. However, in both cases we should note that it is the searching importing
rms (and their domestic partners) which are the most sensitive to macroeconomic shocks: established
pairings, whether domestic or international, are far more robust.
The conclusion should be that, in the event of a combined credit and demand shock hitting an economy
which had been undergoing a process of steady growth and increasing trade openness, there will be a relatively
large proportion of trading rms and their partners (as implied by equation (15)) which will exit the market
relatively quickly.
One should perhaps not be surprised by this nding. Trade search can be viewed as a kind of capital
formation, with rms prepared to undergo losses in the early years of search, in order to make an expected
positive return thereafter, once they are established. Like any form of capital formation, we would expect
search capital formation to be sensitive, both to changes in the cost and availability of credit, and to
accelerator-type changes in overall demand growth. That is what this model indicates.
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6 Endogenous policy responses to a boom or a shock
We have so far established that, during a globalisation boom, where demand and imports are rising fast,
there will be at any one time a relatively high proportion of trade which is accounted for by searching rms,
whose presence in the market is footloose, and who are vulnerable to either demand and/or credit shocks.
This, by itself, implies that the globalisation process can be suddenly halted by unexpected shocks, regardless
of any policy response. Moreover, since search is necessary for the long-run growth of trade, a shock may
have a prolonged negative impact upon trade.
We now want to consider how trade policy might respond to economic circumstances, given a search
model, where di¤erent components of foreign supply di¤er greatly in terms of their price sensitivity.
Figure 7, below, shows schematically the e¤ects of imposing a tari¤ on an economy with a large amount
of initial importers who are searching (and hence price-sensitive). The elastic portion of the supply curve,
accounted fo by the initial searching importers, means that a tari¤ has to be substantial before it can begin
to lower the import price. Consequently, the transfer from foreign rms to the government imposing the
tari¤ (area D) is small relative to the loss of domestic surplus (A+B+D), and it is highly unlikely a non-zero
tari¤ can improve national welfare.
P'2
Domestic
supply
Domestic + foreign
supply
Demand
Y
P*
Market
aggregate
price
Figure 7: Only if the transfer from foreigners, D,
exceeds A + B + C
will a tariff improve national welfare.
Taiff
A
B
C
D
Initial searching importers
P'1
Now compare this with gure 8, where there are no searching rms initially. In this case, it is relatively
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easy to set an optimal tari¤, which improves national welfare by forcing down import prices.
P'1
P'2
Domestic
supply with
given no of firms
Domestic + foreign
supply
Demand
Y
P
Figure 7: Setting of an optimal tariff when there are no initial
searching firms
A+BC
D
The implication is that there is likely to be a discontinuity in tari¤-setting: when the sector is shrinking,
or growing slowly, optimal tari¤s are positive, while, when the sectoral rate of import growth exceeds a
threshold rate, optimal tari¤s fall to zero.
The analysis here is somewhat simplied, since in reality one needs to consider tari¤s in a dynamic
setting. In due course, even with a tari¤, the natural death of existing matched rms will lead the economy
back to a position where searching rms begin to reenter the market - under some circumstances, we would
expect this to lead to a cycle of optimal tari¤s over time. Nevertheless, the situation with stalled growth
indicates a signicant di¤erence between eras of prolonged trade growth, where protection is not favoured,
and eras of stagnation, where it is.
7 Return of the Prisoners Dilemma in trade liberalisation?
The title of this section is deliberately somewhat provocative. Trade liberalisation is often portrayed as a
prisoners dilemma situation: liberalisation benets countries collectively, but large countries, individually,
have an incentive to cheat and impose optimal (terms-of-trade-improving) tari¤s.
The argument of this paper is that, in a rapidly changing, globalising world,. the incentives to impose
protection in this way would be greatly reduced by the presence of a relatively large share of footloose trade,
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associated with searching rms. In such circumstances, the incentives of individual countries are not far out
of line from those of the global economy, which benets from free trade.
This conclusion might raise some eyebrows: few involved in trade negotiations over recent decades would
argue that they were pushing on an open door (as the failure of the Doha Round talks indicates). Neverthe-
less, trade liberalisation has undoubtedly made substantial strides - particularly with respect to developing
countries abandoning previous autarkic developmental strategies, but also in terms of successive rounds of
tari¤ reduction by the advanced countries. Perhaps most signicantly, where protection has been maintained,
or liberalisation has been resisted, the reasons have tended to be argued in terms of distributional impact,
or in terms of damage to countries within trade blocs which were dependent on trade diverted from poorer
countries outside the bloc (for example, Portugal or Italy resisting EU liberalisation of textiles and footwear
industries). In general, the argument that high tari¤s benet national income -at least, when based upon
terms of trade arguments - has rarely been used. An exception may be in agricultural commodities.
Part of the reason may be a trend towards accepting that the price elasticity of demand for traded
commodities is perhaps higher than we used to think - for example, Anderson and van Wincoops (2004)
survey cites elasticities of between 5 and 10 for many commodities: a far higher number than traditionally
used in Armington CGE models of the 1980s and 1990s. These higher trade elasticities are seen as tting the
data because of Ricardian, xed-factor elements in trade,20 including rm heterogeneity, which mean that
supply elasticities are reduced. However, a search-based interpretation would say that supply elasticities
di¤er considerably ex ante and ex post, and that expanding supply may be more elastic than contracting
supply.
In addition, the recent wave of globalisation has essentially involved connecting a large workforce in
China, India, Asia and Eastern Europe to global markets from which they were previously isolated by
autarkic policies and/or by their location in pre-industrial societies. The supply of labour to the globalising
cities of Asia has been elastic at a low wage, so ensuring that, once search and other capital costs are met,
there is an elastic supply of unskilled labour-intensive goods, meaning that optimal tari¤s for large, advanced
countries are likely to be much less than at some other stages of global development.21
20Eaton and Kortum, 2002.
21The situation described here in some ways mimics Sir Arthur Lewiss model of the development of trade, whereby large
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A prolonged global recession - perhaps especially one where credit is short - is likely to change this
situation for the worse (as memories of the 1930s indicate). In terms of the very schematic analysis of this
paper, we are moving from the situation in gure 6, where there is a substantial volume of footloose trade, to
that in gure 7, where the supply of price-elastic, searching trade is insu¢ cient to maintain the incentive to
keep tari¤s low. In such a situation, the interests of individual countries (which may wish to try to manipulate
their terms of trade by protection) and those of the global economy are no longer aligned, hence raising the
risks of triggering a round of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. Given the recent advances in understanding the
interaction between trade integration and growth,22 there must be a danger that protection could trigger a
self-perpetuating circle, whereby trade growth is reduced, increasing incentives to protect.
A secondary element, which must be of particular concern when countries are credit constrained, is the
potential e¤ect on the stability of existing agreements, where these are sustained by the threat of retaliation in
a trigger strategy. Such a strategy depends upon people weighing the loss of future welfare, from the collapse
of trade agreements, more highly than the short-term gain from imposing a terms-of-trade-improving tari¤.
Again, if credit constraints shorten national time-horizons, the prisoners dilemma will be restored.
In sum: the recent wave of globalisation has been sustained and strengthened by the coming-together
of national and global interests, when trade is relatively footloose and credit is available. The removal of
those conditions, once a shock drives out the more price-elastic elements of trade, creates a totally new set of
incentives, where national interests are to protect, yet the global interest still requires a liberal trade regime.
If cooperation is allowed to fall, it may be very di¢ cult to restore global trade to its recent Golden Age.
supplies of Indian and Chinese labour in the late 19th and early 20th centuries pushed down prices of unskilled-intensive
commodities. Ironically, this led Lewis towards pessimism about export-led development in developing countries, on the
grounds of elasticity pessimism.
22Not just the standard comparative advantage e¤ects, but the pro-competitive, choice-widening and scale-exploiting e¤ects
identied by the New Trade Theory (Krugman, 1979), as well as the rm selection e¤ects of the New New Trade Theory (Melitz,
2003). The starting premises of this paper - that search costs, even in phase 2 of our time-schema, maintain trade at below the
level which would be favoured in the presence of full information, rather emphasise that trade-impeding policies will push the
World further from optimality.
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Appendix 1: The matching setup
The paper follows Rauch and Trindade (2003) and Rauch and Casella (2003) in using a matching frame-
work based upon Salops circular cylinder (note that Grossman and Helpman, 2002, use a similar setup).
This is shown in Figure A1, below. Position on the circle refers to some rm-specic characteristics. The
essence of the Salop model is that rms are ex ante equal in e¢ ciency, but that rm performance is deter-
mined by the degree of t with the match partner: the aim is to match with a rm directly opposite on the
cylinder. Hence, match quality, i; is measured by the circumference distance between the two rms. Firms
only have a single partner at any time.
Firm U
Ideal Match
Firm DReservationquality match
Firm D
Satisfactory matches
Match quality
is distance between
firms along
circumference
Figure A1: The Salop matching framework
An individual, random
match
The key di¤erence between the match-searching model employed here and the models in the earlier
papers is the ability of a rm in an unsatisfactory match to renew search, after a given contract period. This
determines the generation of a reservation match quality, R: The decision process of the rm is shown in
Figure A2 below.
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Figure A2: The match-searching decision setup
Any match with a circumference length greater than R will yield a prot great enough for the rms to
choose to continue. This gives a probability of acceptance of 1  R. However, of these pairings, proportion
D will naturally expire anyway during the rst contract period, so any surviving rm will have to renew
search. By contrast, proportion R of initial pairings will be unsatisfactory, and be dropped after one
contract period.
We note that the prot of a reservation quality match (i = R) is zero. Prot increases linearly with
respect to match quality, so that the expected prot of a successful match (where R < i < 1) is
1+R
2 minus
the prot of a reservation quality match. This yields an expected prot of 1 R2 : Likewise, an unsatisfactory
match qill have an expected prot of  R2 : Finally note that a renewed search will yield a present discounted
value of zero.
Table A1 Probability Expected prot
Match above reservation
Satisfactory Both rms survive (1  R)(1 D) 1+R2   R = 1 R2
One or more dies (1  R)D 0
Unsatisfactory R
R
2   R =  R2
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We wish now to solve this problem, based upon the knowledge that monopolistic competition will equate
the expected return from entering a search process to zero.
Discounted prot with a successful match = one period expected loss with a poor match;
(1  R)2
2
=
2R
2(1 + )
; where  = +D;
(1 + )(1  2R + 2R) = 2R;
2R   2(1 + )R + (1 + ) = 0;
R =
2(1 + )p4(1 + )2   4(1 + )
2
;
= 1 +  
p
(1 + );
since only the negative root lies between zero and unity.
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